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NOTE

A LACK OF DEFERENCE: RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE
IN CALDWELL V. MACO WORKERS’
COMPENSATION TRUST
William Mac Morris*

I. INTRODUCTION
Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Compensation Trust provides a striking
example of the Montana Supreme Court applying a rational basis standard
with significant bite.1 In Caldwell, the Court, while purporting to apply the
deferential rational basis standard of review, struck down on equal protection grounds a workers’ compensation provision that terminates access to
“vocational rehabilitation benefits” when a worker becomes eligible to receive social security retirement. Caldwell is significant for numerous reasons. First, Caldwell demonstrates a clear divide within the Court about the
appropriate level of scrutiny, or deference, that should be applied in assessing the constitutionality of workers’ compensation provisions. Second,
Caldwell is part of a “recent trend” in which the Court has declared a workers’ compensation provision unconstitutional.2 Third, the political and legislative backdrop in which Caldwell arises provides insight into the conversation between the Court and the political branches of government in the
area of workers’ compensation law.
* William Mac Morris, candidate for J.D. 2013, University of Montana School of Law. The
author thanks his family for love and support, especially his wife, Julie, his parents, George and Ann,
and his dog, Hunter. The author is grateful to the Montana Law Review editors and staff for their
invaluable guidance in preparing this casenote.
1. Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Compen. Trust, 256 P.3d 923 (Mont. 2011).
2. Reesor v. Mont. St. Fund, 103 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Mont. 2004) (Rice, Gray & Warner, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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As of 2010, Montana employers paid the highest workers’ compensation premiums in the country.3 In 2011, Governor Schweitzer signed into
law House Bill 334, a bill that represents a major overhaul of the workers’
compensation system and is designed to reduce premiums through substantial cuts to worker benefits.4 The sponsor of House Bill 334, Representative
Scott Reichner, blamed the judicial system for necessitating the reforms:
“We had businesses just up and walking across the border to Idaho and
North Dakota. It was killing us. Lawyers push the envelope and make the
system looser and looser and next thing you know we’re covering everybody for everything.”5 Caldwell provides insight into this larger conversation between the Court, which exhibits suspicion of limits on workers’ compensation benefits, and of the political branches of government, which are
operating with a mandate to keep workers’ compensation costs down.6
This note examines Caldwell and argues that the Montana Supreme
Court’s lack of deference to the legislative determination was improper.
The note critiques the Court’s current framework for analyzing the constitutionality of workers’ compensation regulations and proposes adoption of a
test that addresses the unique circumstances of workers in the workers’
compensation system, while enabling faithful adherence to rational basis
review.
Section II discusses the rational basis test, its roots, and the purposes it
serves. Section III details Caldwell and the Court’s holding. Section IV
analyzes the Court’s decision in detail, and discusses the concurrences and
dissent. Section V concludes the note with thoughts about the possible unintended negative consequences of applying heightened scrutiny in the area
of workers’ compensation law and urges adoption of a new analytical
framework for assessing the constitutionality of workers’ compensation
laws.

3. Jay Dotter & Mike Manley, 2010 Oregon Workers’ Compensation Premium Rate Ranking
Summary tbl. 2, http://www.cbs.state.or.us/imd/rasums/2082/09web/09_2082.pdf (Oct. 2010).
4. Phil Drake, Governor Signs Bill Aimed at Major Workers’ Compensation Reform, http://
montana.watchdog.org/2011/04/12/governor-signs-bill-aimed-at-major-workers-comp-reform (Apr. 12,
2011); Mellissa Maynard, Workers’ Comp. System Getting Stricter, Stateline, http://www.stateline.org/
live/details/story?contentId=594750 (Aug. 18, 2011).
5. Maynard, supra n. 4.
6. See Drake, supra n. 4; Mike Dennison, Bills Aim to Cut Costs of Montana Workers’ Comp
Program, Missoulian, http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/bills-aim-to-cut-costs-of-montanaworkers-comp-program/article_3ada9a14-2d00-11e0-aecf-001cc4c03286.html (Jan. 30, 2011); Jeff
Windmueller, HB 334 Will Lower Employers’ Work-Comp Payments, Helena Independent Record,
http://helenair.com/news/article_bb607566-7eb6-11e0-8c48-001cc4c002e0.html (May 15, 2011).
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II. FOUNDATION

AND

BACKGROUND

OF THE

RATIONAL BASIS TEST

The “rational basis test” provides the default framework for Montana
and federal courts when assessing the constitutionality of regulations affecting economic policy.7 The test provides that a reviewing court will uphold
a regulation if the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state end.8
Under rational basis review, a statute is presumed constitutional, and, if the
policy behind a law is unclear, a court may consider any possible legitimate
purpose that the court can conceive to uphold the statute.9 It is the most
deferential standard of review, and it demonstrates the courts’ recognition
of, among other things, the expertise of the political branches to craft complicated, economic regulation.10 In Montana, so long as a regulation does
not affect a suspect class or implicate a fundamental constitutional right,
rational basis review is applied in equal protection challenges.11
The rational basis test was developed by the United States Supreme
Court and is regarded by commentators as a response to the political climate in the 1930s and a rejection of the so-called Lochner Era, an era when
state regulations were routinely struck down by the courts through Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenges.12 The Lochner Era takes its
name from Lochner v. New York.13 In Lochner, the Court overturned a
New York statute that prohibited bakers from working more than sixty
hours in one week.14 The Court held that the statute was not a legitimate
exercise of the state’s police powers and infringed on bakers’ constitutional
right of freedom to contract.15 Lochner is widely criticized as a symbol of
the Court’s tendency for judicial overreaching throughout the period.16
Critics argue that in the decades around Lochner, the Court sought to impose its own political views and beliefs, and gave little deference to laws
created by the democratically elected political branches.17 Thus, critics
contend, the Court during the Lochner Era violated the proper respect due
7. Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 601 (2000).
8. See e.g. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926 (citing Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 222 P.3d
566, 572 (Mont. 2009)).
9. See e.g. Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 575.
10. See e.g. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 373 (1949).
11. See e.g. Henry v. St. Compen. Ins. Fund, 982 P.2d 456, 461 (Mont. 1999).
12. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85
B.U. L. Rev. 677, 684–685 (2005).
13. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. Id. at 64.
15. Id.
16. See e.g. Balkin, supra n. 12, at 686.
17. Id.
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to the separate spheres of government power.18 The result of this judicial
overreaching was to stifle the ability of state and federal legislatures to craft
pragmatic polices that met the critical needs and desires of the people.19
Thirty years after Lochner, in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,20
the Court signaled an end to the Lochner Era.21 There, the Court upheld a
minimum wage law for women against a due process challenge, affording
substantial deference to the state legislature in a decision that has come to
define the rational basis test.22 The Court stated, “we have said that the
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that
every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that though the
court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power.”23 The Court
limited its review of the law to determining whether the law was “arbitrary
or capricious,” reiterating that “even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the Legislature is entitled
to its judgment.”24
Scholars view West Coast Hotel as providing a significant step toward
creating a jurisprudential climate that allowed states and the federal government to enact social reforms and New Deal legislation.25 The rational basis
test was developed for three primary reasons: (1) to recognize the dangers
of judicial interference in the area of economic policy, (2) to respect the
political process that reflects the will of the people, and (3) to place practical limits on judicial power. Thus, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma,26 the United States Supreme Court famously declared:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. . . . For protection against abuses
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.27
18. Id.
19. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383, 1385 (2001); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise
and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 1 (Duke University Press 1993); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Culture Crises of the Fuller Court Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State
1888–1910, 104 Yale L.J. 2309, 2310 (1995).
20. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
21. Balkin, supra n. 12, at 686.
22. W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 398–400.
23. Id. at 398.
24. Id. at 399.
25. Balkin, supra n. 12, at 686.
26. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
27. Id at 488.
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This level of judicial deference stems, at least in part, from the recognition
that “courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct.”28 By 1963,
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa, described the jurisprudential shift from Lochner to West Coast Hotel thus:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . . and like cases—that due process
authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded. We have returned to
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected
to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, “We are
not concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.” Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic
problems, and this Court does not sit to “subject the state to an intolerable
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to secure.”29

Both federal and Montana courts have recognized that judicial restraint
is especially appropriate when analyzing equal protection challenges. In
Eastman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Montana Supreme Court declared
that “‘[t]he problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition.’”30 The Montana Supreme Court has also
cited with approval the following classic formulation for judicial restraint in
the area of equal protection provided by West Coast Hotel: “The Legislature
‘is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to
those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.’ . . . There is
no ‘doctrinaire requirement’ that the legislation should be couched in all
embracing terms.”31
This paradigm of judicial deference has not always been precisely followed. Since the development of the rational basis test, Courts occasionally
fail to apply the judicial restraint that the standard demands, and instead
apply a heightened level of scrutiny while purportedly adhering to the traditional rational basis test.32 Commentators refer to this inexplicit heightened
scrutiny as “rational basis with bite.”33 Courts applying rational basis with
bite review are criticized for two major reasons: (1) for failing to specify the
factors prompting a heightened scrutiny, and (2) for threatening to under28. Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at 510 (quoting Tussman, supra n. 10, at 373).
29. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
30. Eastman v. A. Richfield Co., 777 P.2d 862, 866 (Mont. 1989) (quoting Williamson, 348 U.S. at
489).
31. State v. Safeway Stores, 76 P.2d 81, 92 (quoting W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 400).
32. The most notorious example is likely City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985). See id. at 458 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. See Brianne J. Gorod, Does Lochner Live?: The Disturbing Implications of Craigmiles v. Giles,
21 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 537, 539 (2003); see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
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mine constitutional limits on judicial power by repeating the mistakes associated with the Lochner Era.34 Justice Marshall, dissenting in City of
Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, described well the dangers of
applying a freewheeling rational basis standard:
The suggestion that the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort of
searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower courts to subject
economic and commercial classifications to similar and searching “ordinary”
rational-basis review—a small and regrettable step back toward the days of
Lochner v. New York. Moreover, by failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s “second order” rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked. Lower courts are thus left in the dark on this important question, and
this Court remains unaccountable for its decisions employing, or refusing to
employ, particularly searching scrutiny.35

The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that equal
protection challenges to workers’ compensation laws are appropriately analyzed under rational basis review, because workers’ compensation laws
neither affect a suspect class nor infringe on any fundamental right.36 The
Montana Supreme Court has adopted the standard set forth in West Coast
Hotel, quoting it with approval.37 The Court has further held that under
rational basis review, a challenged statute will be upheld if “any reasonably
conceivable state of facts” supports it.38 Yet, the Court’s opinion in Caldwell reveals a less-than-faithful adherence to this standard, discarding it in
favor of rational basis with bite. As with other courts applying rational
basis with bite, the Montana Supreme Court can be criticized on the same
grounds.
III. FACTS

AND

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 25, 2005, Harold Caldwell sustained head injuries in a
slip-and-fall accident while working as manager at the Ravalli County Airport.39 Caldwell was 77 years old at the time.40 Caldwell’s head injuries
prevented him from returning to work at the airport.41 Caldwell received
34. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
35. Id. at 459–460.
36. See e.g. Henry, 982 P.2d at 461–462; Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 855 P.2d 506, 509 (Mont.
1993).
37. Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at 511; State v. Safeway Stores, 76 P.2d 81, 85–86 (Mont. 1938); Geil v.
Missoula Irrigation Dist., 59 P.3d 398, 406 (Mont. 2002).
38. See e.g. Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 575; Kottel v. State, 60 P.3d 403, 416 (Mont. 2002).
39. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 924.
40. Id.
41. Br. of Appellee at 1, Caldwell, 256 P.3d 923.
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wage loss and medical benefits through the airport’s workers’ compensation
insurer, MACo Workers’ Compensation Trust (“MACo”).42
After recovering, Caldwell filed a claim with MACo for vocational
rehabilitation benefits.43 MACo denied the claim pursuant to Montana
Code Annotated § 39–71–710, which cuts off eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits when the worker becomes eligible for Social Security
retirement benefits.44 Caldwell had been collecting Social Security retirement benefits since age 62,45 and was 79 years old when he applied for
vocational rehabilitation benefits.46
Caldwell challenged the constitutionality of § 39–71–710, contending
that it violated his right to equal protection under the law because the statute
denied him benefits based solely on his age and access to Social Security.47
The Workers’ Compensation Court held that the statute violated equal protection because it created two similarly situated classes that were treated
differently under the law and the disparate treatment was not rationally related to any legitimate state end.48 MACo appealed and the Montana Supreme Court, in a 5–2 opinion written by Justice Morris, affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court.49 The Court held that the statute
served no legitimate government interest other than cost containment of the
workers’ compensation system, and that this interest alone was insufficient
to justify the disparate treatment.50
Justice Cotter filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Nelson, in
which she argued that striking down the law would have little impact on the
cost of workers’ compensation, because eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits is subject to screening wherein age and capacity are taken into
consideration.51 Justice Nelson filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the graying of the American workforce, as well as the increase in
the cost of living, were reasons to find the statute irrational.52 Nelson also
rejected a toothless review of the law, and urged the Court to adopt a
stricter rational basis standard than the one that the dissent pointed to as
42. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 924.
43. Id. at 925.
44. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–710 (2011).
45. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 924.
46. Br. of Amicus Mont. St. Fund at 2, Caldwell, 256 P.3d 923. Montana State Fund is the legislatively created body that administers the Workers’ Compensation system. See Mont. Code Ann.
§ 37–1–201.
47. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 925.
48. Id.
49. Id.at 931.
50. Id. at 930.
51. Id. at 931.
52. Id. at 931–932.
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providing reason to uphold the law.53 Justice Baker filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rice, in which she argued that the Court failed to
afford the legislature proper deference under rational basis review, and that
notwithstanding the policy arguments of the majority, the statute should be
upheld because it was rationally related to the legitimate government objective of targeting limited resources toward those who are most likely to use
them.54
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s opinion in Caldwell consistently exhibits an improper
level of scrutiny in reviewing the challenged statute’s limitation on benefits.
At each stage—interpreting the statutory framework, reviewing precedent,
determining if the classes were similarly situated, and applying rational basis scrutiny—the Court did little to afford the statute the appropriate benefit
of presumptive constitutionality and glossed over reasons to uphold the statute. The Court rejected a series of arguments that should have legitimated
the statute under a deferential standard. The analysis that follows will take
up each of these stages and demonstrate how the Court strayed from the
deferential standard, exhibiting, instead, a level of suspicion that is inappropriate when applying rational basis review. First, however, the note will
provide some background about the challenged statute and two prior Montana Supreme Court decisions in which the law’s other provisions were reviewed.
A. The Challenged Statute: § 39–71–710
The challenged statute in Caldwell, Montana Code Annotated
§ 39–71–710, is entitled “Termination of benefits upon retirement.” It applies to workers who are eligible to receive Social Security retirement benefits and cuts off their eligibility for, among other benefits, vocational rehabilitation benefits.
Vocational rehabilitation benefits are provided by operation of Montana Code Annotated § 39–71–1006 which is designed to return the disabled worker to work and offers vocational training funds including tuition,
fees, books, and other retraining expenses in order to assist the worker “in
acquiring skills or aptitudes to return to work” in order to “reasonably reduce[ ] the worker’s actual wage loss.”55 To be eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits, a workers must meet the definition of a “disabled
53. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 932.
54. Id. at 932–935.
55. Id. at 925; Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1011(4).
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worker” in addition to other criteria.56 A “disabled worker” is “a worker
who has a permanent impairment . . . from a work-related injury that precludes the worker from returning to the job . . . and who has an actual wage
loss as a result of the injury.”57
Eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits requires a considerable
procedural review beyond simply meeting the definition of a “disabled
worker.”58 First, a rehabilitation provider, as designated by the insurer,
must certify that “the worker has reasonable vocational goals and reasonable reemployment opportunity.”59 Second, the rehabilitation provider must
certify that rehabilitation will result in “a reasonable reduction in the
worker’s actual wage loss.”60 Third, the rehabilitation planner must draft a
specific rehabilitation plan “tak[ing] into consideration the worker’s age,
education, training, work history, residual physical capacities, and vocational interests.”61 Finally, the worker must agree to and follow the plan.62
When all of these conditions are met, the worker may receive biweekly
rehabilitation benefits for up to 104 weeks.63
The Court’s opinion and Justice Cotter’s concurrence did not address
the procedural burden placed on the insurer when providing vocational rehabilitation benefits. Justice Cotter proposed that the concern that striking
down the statute was going to result in rising costs for the insurer was
“largely unwarranted” because “there is a likelihood that the [system] will
screen a large number of older applicants out of the system.” This analysis,
however, does not take into account the procedural burden that nevertheless
must be implemented in order to determine whether an individual is eligible
for rehabilitation benefits. It also fails to consider the cost of addressing
challenges to an insurer’s denial of benefits. While Justice Cotter may be
correct that a large portion of claims could be screened out, resulting in no
actual payment of vocational rehabilitation benefits, the challenged statute
undoubtedly reduces the cost incurred in processing claims for vocational
rehabilitation benefits.
B. Prior Challenges to § 39–71–710: Reesor and Satterlee
In addition to creating a cut-off for eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits, § 39–71–710 provides that when a worker becomes eligible to
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1006(1)(a)(i).
Id. at § 39–71–1011(3).
Id. at § 39–71–1006(4)–(7).
Id. at § 39–71–1006(1)(b).
Id.
Id. at § 39–71–1006(1)(c).
Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1032.
Id. at § 39–71–1006(2).
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receive Social Security benefits, he also becomes ineligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits and permanent total disability benefits.64
Prior to Caldwell, these other two components of § 39–71–710 were challenged on equal protection grounds.
In 2004, the Court decided Reesor v. Montana State Fund,65 and overturned, on equal protection grounds, § 39–71–710’s elimination of eligibility for permanent partial disability benefits (“PPD benefits”).66 The Court
reversed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court in a 4–3 decision. The Court rejected State Fund’s argument that the receipt of Social
Security retirement benefits was sufficient to create two dissimilarly situated classes, and held that “age . . . is the only identifiable distinguishing
factor between the two classes.”67 The Court further held that Social Security retirement benefits and workers’ compensation disability benefits were
distinct programs, so that no duplication of benefits occurred by providing a
worker with both benefits simultaneously.68 Ultimately, the Court held that
the provision violated equal protection because no rational basis existed to
deny workers’ compensation disability benefits solely on the basis of age.69
Justice Rice, in dissent, argued strenuously that the Court “failed to properly exercise rational basis review.”70
By contrast, in 2009, the Court decided Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Company,71 in which it upheld, against an equal protection
challenge, § 39–71–710’s termination of eligibility for permanent total disability benefits (“PTD benefits”). In a 5–2 opinion, the Court distinguished
Reesor, finding that “the purposes of PPD and PTD differ greatly.”72 The
Court held that “while a PPD claimant will presumably be able to return to
work and earn an income, a PTD claimant will not.”73 The Court noted that
PPD benefits exist for a limited amount of time while “without the statute,
PTD benefits would run on until the claimant’s death.”74 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that “it is rational for the workers’ compensation system to
terminate PTD benefits at a time when, statistically, most people’s worklives have ended. While this may not seem fair, it is not unconstitutional.”75 Justice Morris, in dissent, argued that “‘rational basis with bite’
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at § 39–71–710.
Reesor, 103 P.3d 1019.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1023–1024.
Id.
Id. at 1026 (Rice, Gray & Warner, JJ., dissenting).
Satterlee, 222 P.3d 566.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574.
Id.
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. . . surely would invalidate the legislature’s . . . effort to use SSRI eligibility as a proxy for retirement.”76 Justice Morris criticized the majority’s
“toothless approach,” and concluded that he would “resolve [the policy]
debate in favor of injured workers who have foregone their right to seek
damages through the tort system.”77
Through Reesor, Satterlee, and Caldwell, every provision of
§ 39–71–710 has been challenged on equal protection grounds. Furthermore, every decision regarding the statute has resulted in divided courts
with the opposing sides disagreeing about the appropriate level of deference
or scrutiny that the Court should apply to the statute.
C. The Majority Opinion in Caldwell
The majority opinion in Caldwell was written by Justice Morris. As
evident from his dissent in Satterlee, Justice Morris favors rational basis
with bite. The analysis that follows is not meant to discredit the arguments
made by the Court. While an effort is made to closely scrutinize the opinion and critique the Court’s reasoning, ultimately the point to be made is
not that the Court “got everything wrong,” but to demonstrate the wide
disparity between the deference that should be applied under a traditional
rational basis standard in which “[e]very possible presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act,” and the Court’s
readiness in Caldwell to find reasons to reject the challenged statute.78
1. Framing the Issue
The Court framed the issue before it as follows: “Does the categorical
denial of rehabilitation benefits to a workers’ compensation claimant violate
equal protection when the basis for denial turns solely on the claimant’s
age-based eligibility for social security benefits?”79 With the issue thus
framed, the Court’s ultimate holding seemed a foregone conclusion.
If the denial of rehabilitation benefits truly turned solely on the claimant’s age, then finding a violation of equal protection is likely mandated by
common sense and the Court’s holding in Reesor. MACo and amicus Montana State Fund (“State Fund”) contended that the denial of benefits was
based on more than just age. As a preliminary matter, State Fund argued
that the denial was based on the differences between the two classes, both
inherent and statutory.80 MACo argued that the basis for the denial was
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 577 (Morris & Nelson, JJ., dissenting).
Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 577, 579.
Powell v. St. Compen. Ins. Fund, 15 P.3d 877, 881 (Mont. 2000).
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 924.
Br. of Amicus State Fund, supra n. 46, at 8–14.
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rooted in a variety of legitimate reasons besides even the differences attending age, including, among others, containing the cost of the workers’ compensation system, avoiding a duplication of benefits, and tailoring benefits
to need.81
2. The Three-Step Process for Analyzing Equal Protection Challenges
The Court followed its established three-step process for analyzing
equal protection challenges.82 Under this approach, as a threshold issue, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged statute results in disparate
treatment of two similarly situated classes.83 The next step is to determine
the appropriate level of scrutiny.84 The third and final step is to evaluate
the statute by applying the appropriate level of scrutiny.85
A notable problem with this three-step process is that the Court’s level
of scrutiny in the first step, evaluating whether there are two similarly situated classes, is undefined. It appears to be more appropriate to evaluate
whether there are two similarly situated classes after determining the level
of scrutiny. This approach would provide the Court with some guidance as
to how similarities or differences are to be weighed. If deference is due to
the legislative determination because rational basis is appropriate, then deference should also be given to the legislature to draw lines based on real
differences. By contrast, in cases where strict scrutiny is found to be appropriate, the Court would closely scrutinize the legislative line-drawing, making it easier to find similarly situated classes.
Alternatively, the determination of this threshold issue should be analyzed with a presumption that the classes are not similarly situated. Such an
approach would be consistent with the Court’s stated policies that statutes
are presumed constitutional and that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable
doubt.86 While no standard of scrutiny for making this threshold determination has been expressed, the Court’s current framework seems to favor a
presumption of similarly situated classes, rather than a presumption against
it.87 This contravenes the Court’s stated position that statutes are presumed
constitutional.
81. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929.
82. Id. at 926 (citing Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 571).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 927.
85. Id.
86. See e.g. Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 569–570.
87. The Satterlee Court, for example, found that the classes were similarly situated, although it later
drew distinctions between those older persons who are considered “retired” by the statute and those
younger persons who are considered by the statute to remain in the workforce. Compare Satterlee, 222
P.3d at 571 with id. at 574.
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a. Step One: Determining Whether the Two Classes are Similarly
Situated
MACo stipulated that the two classes were similarly situated and the
Court agreed.88 But in an amicus curiae brief supporting MACo’s position,
State Fund argued that the two classes were distinct. State Fund contended
that those eligible for Social Security retirement benefits were “permanently
out of the workforce” by operation of § 39–71–710(1) which states that
once a claimant is eligible for Social Security retirement he is “considered
to be retired.”89 State Fund quoted Satterlee which held that “when an individual is considered retired, they [sic] have, by definition, ended their work
life.”90 Accordingly, State Fund argued that those retired and permanently
out of the workforce cannot be similarly situated with those who are not
retired and remain in the workforce.”91
Relying on both Satterlee and Reesor, the Court rejected State Fund’s
argument.92 The majority held that the two classes were similarly situated
because both met the statutory definition of a “disabled worker”93 who
“must rely on the Workers’ Compensation Act as their exclusive remedy.”94
Quoting Reesor, the majority held that age was “‘the only identifiable distinguishing factor between the two classes’”95 and that “‘chronological age
. . . is unrelated to a person’s ability to engage in meaningful employment.’”96
It is curious that MACo did not argue that the two classes were dissimilarly situated. While both Satterlee and Reesor found similarly situated
classes, the disability benefits at issue in those cases and the purpose served
by those benefits, are distinct from the benefits sought in Caldwell. Receipt
of vocational rehabilitation benefits is predicated on the worker pursuing an
education in a new field of work and possessing the potential to succeed in
the new field,97 while receipt of disability benefits is simply predicated on
wage loss and the category of injury incurred by the worker in a workrelated accident.98 This distinction is relevant to distinguishing between
88. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926.
89. Br. of Amicus State Fund, supra n. 46, at 8–14; Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–710(1).
90. Br. of Amicus State Fund, supra n. 46, at 11.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926.
93. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1011(3).
94. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926 (citing § 39–71–710).
95. Id. (quoting Reesor, 103 P.3d at 1022 in turn citing Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 571).
96. Id. (quoting Reesor, 103 P.3d at 1022).
97. Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1006(b) (worker must have “reasonable vocational goals and reasonable reemployment opportunity”); id. at § 39–71–1006(2) (rehabilitation benefits paid “while the
worker is satisfactorily progressing in the agreed-upon rehabilitation plan”).
98. Id. at § 39–71–703(1); id. at § 39–71–702.
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older workers who may be less likely to desire, seek training in, or succeed
in an entirely new vocation, and younger workers who may be eager for
vocational training which could serve them for the remainder of their presumably much longer work life. Indeed, age is one factor used in determining a worker’s eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits.99
Furthermore, a worker receiving Social Security retirement benefits is
distinct from one who is not receiving retirement benefits in the obvious
sense that the “retired” worker is already receiving some income from the
government, whereas the younger worker is probably not. The younger injured worker might rely exclusively on workers’ compensation assistance
for income, unlike an older injured worker who is also eligible for retirement benefits. Therefore, the “retired” worker is arguably less likely to
need all the benefits offered by workers’ compensation assistance.
The Court’s position that age is the only distinguishing factor between
the two classes is overstated. Changes in age are attended by changes in a
variety of characteristics, including health and physical ability. The Court’s
contention that age is “unrelated to a person’s ability to engage in meaningful employment” is similarly overstated. Age-based restrictions on the legal
right to work or to work in certain positions are common and clearly defy
this sweeping proclamation of the majority.100
Relying on Reesor and Satterlee, and the stipulation of MACo, the
Court spent little time in making the determination that the classes were
similarly situated, and quickly moved on to the next step.101 Though, the
issue was not strenuously argued, the Court stridently rejected State Fund’s
arguments and gave little deference to the legislative determination that the
classes were distinct.
b. Step Two: Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Having found that the classes were similarly situated, the Court moved
to the next step of the equal protection analysis—determining the appropriate level of scrutiny. Equal protection claims challenging workers’ compensation statutes have consistently implicated a level of scrutiny no higher
than rational basis review.102 Courts reason that rational basis review is
appropriate because workers’ compensation statutes do not “infringe upon
99. Id. at § 39–71–1006(1)(c).
100. See e.g. Naval Military Personnel Manual 1040150, ¶ 3 (1983) (setting maximum age for enlistment in Naval Reserve at 42); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8401(14)(ii) (2006) (requiring firefighters to be
“young and physically vigorous individuals”); see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (limiting qualification for office of presidency to those who “have attained to the Age of thirty five Years”).
101. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926.
102. See e.g. Reesor, 103 P.3d at 1022; Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 572; Henry, 982 P.2d at 462.
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the rights of a suspect class or involve fundamental rights.”103 Accordingly, the parties agreed that rational basis was the appropriate standard.104
The Court spent only a sentence defining this standard: “Rational basis
requires that § 39–71–710, MCA, bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest.”105 The majority’s brevity in discussing the level of
scrutiny is telling. By contrast, Justice Baker, dissenting, spent much of her
opinion defining rational basis review and discussing the appropriate deference it requires.106 Justice Baker noted that appropriate application of rational basis mandates upholding a challenged statute if the Court can conceive of a rational basis for it, notwithstanding “forceful public policy argument[s]” against it.107 Likewise, Justice Nelson spent much of his
concurrence addressing rational basis review—arguing for a stricter standard.108
The Court’s single sentence discussion of the standard of review
stands in stark contrast to prior cases. For example, in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County,109 the Court, addressing an equal protection challenge to a
workers’ compensation provision, delivered an opinion that reads like a
paean to judicial deference.110 The Court’s brevity in Caldwell in discussing the deference required by rational basis review reveals the majority’s
likely awareness that the deferential standard conflicts with the scrutinizing
analysis ultimately applied.
c. Step Three: Evaluating the Statute Under Rational Basis Review
(with Bite)
i. Analyzing Precedent
After brief comment on the standard of scrutiny, the Court moved
quickly to the final step of its analysis—evaluating the statute under rational basis review. The Court began by reviewing the most relevant precedent: Reesor and Satterlee.111 According to the Caldwell Court, the “critical distinction” between the two cases was that whereas PPD benefits must
terminate after 375 weeks, PTD benefits do not necessarily terminate after a
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 572.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926.
Id.
Id. at 932–935 (Baker & Rice, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 935.
Id. at 931–932 (Nelson, J., concurring).
Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at 505.
Id. at 508–511.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 925–926.
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limited number of weeks.112 Noting that, like the PPD benefits in Reesor,
vocational rehabilitation benefits are provided for only a limited number of
weeks, the majority aligned the issue before the Court to Reesor, and found
Satterlee only relevant to situations in which there was a risk that a benefit
could “run on until the claimant’s death.”113
Satterlee’s holding, however, was premised on a rationale more fundamental than the distinction between PPD’s time-limited availability and
PTD’s lack of an automatic termination. Satterlee’s fundamental reason for
upholding the statute was as follows: “[I]t is rational for the workers’ compensation system to terminate PTD benefits at a time when, statistically,
most people’s work-lives have ended.”114 Considering this statement from
the Court, Satterlee ultimately determined that the statute was rationally
related to the end of directing limited resources to those who were statistically likely to be in the workforce.
The Satterlee rationale, basing the cut-off on statistical likelihoods,
could similarly apply to eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits. Indeed, the rationale would arguably apply with even greater force. If a
worker may be denied wage-loss benefits because most people at that age
are not working, then a fortiori a worker in the same statistical category
may be denied rehabilitation benefits that would retrain him to reenter the
workforce.
In Caldwell, however, the Court rejected this fundamental holding
from Satterlee without overruling it, and treated it as something conjured up
only by the dissent rather than apposite precedent:
Immediately beneath the surface of MACo’s and MSF’s “best allocation” and
“tailoring” arguments lurks the belief that society should not rehabilitate older
people because the return on the investment may not be as high. This bias
also permeates the Dissent’s reasoning that the legislature may “allocate resources toward those who, statistically speaking, will use them . . . .”115

Thus, Satterlee’s fundamental holding was discarded, and labeled as demonstrating only the dissent’s bias. Meanwhile, the distinction made by the
Satterlee Court between PTD and PPD benefits was elevated by the Cald112. Id. at 927. While the Satterlee Court stated that without the termination imposed by
§ 39–71–710, PTD benefits could “run on until the claimant’s death.” Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 574. In
reality, PTD benefits are only available so long as the claimant suffers a permanent total disability as
defined by § 39–71–116(27). This status requires evidence in the form of objective medical findings.
Moreover, though referred to as a “permanent” and “total” disability, the statutory framework contemplates the possibility of moving from a “permanent total disability” to any of the lesser categories of
injury, such as permanent partial disability or temporary partial disability. Therefore, the “timeframe”
distinction between Reesor and Satterlee, actually represents a flawed understanding of the availability
of PTD benefits.
113. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 927–928.
114. Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 574.
115. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 930.
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well Court to stand for Satterlee’s primary holding so that the Court could
assert that precedent favored striking down the law.
ii. Defining the Policy and Purposes Served by Vocational
Rehabilitation Benefits
After establishing that precedent provided no direct support for the
law, the Court examined the policy behind, and the purposes served by,
providing rehabilitation benefits. It determined that the policy behind providing vocational rehabilitation benefits was found at § 39–71–105(3), subpart three of the “Declaration of Public Policy” which prefaces the Workers’ Compensation Act. Section 39–71–105(3) provides that “an objective
of the workers’ compensation system is to return a worker to work as soon
as possible after the worker has suffered a work-related injury or disease.”116 The Court noted that rehabilitation benefits assist a worker “in
acquiring skills or aptitudes to return to work” and “reasonably reduce a
worker’s actual wage loss”117 The Court stated that the differences in purposes served by various benefits under the workers’ compensation system
“guide our analysis as to whether the categorical elimination of rehabilitation benefits . . . violates equal protection.”118
In focusing on the purposes served by providing the benefit, the Court
largely glossed over the purposes served by placing limitations on the benefit. The Workers’ Compensation Court had held that terminating rehabilitation benefits “[flew] in the face of [the] stated legislative objective” of returning a worker to work after a work related injury.119 The Court quickly
noted that it was error to focus solely on the policy for providing the benefit
when “§ 39–71–105(3) provides the policy statement for providing rehabilitation benefits, as opposed to the policy statement for the elimination of
rehabilitation benefits in § 39–71–710,”120 but the Court almost immediately contradicted itself, stating, “[t]he WCC correctly looked to the policy
statement in § 39–71–105(3), MCA, however, to consider whether the categorical elimination in § 39–71–710, MCA, rationally relates to the governmental interests served by rehabilitation benefits.”
While focusing at length on the policy for providing the benefit, the
Court did not adequately address the policy that discusses the limitations on
workers’ compensation benefits. The first subpart of the “Declaration of
Public Policy” provides:
116. Id. at 928.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Compensation Trust, 2010 MTWCC 24, ¶ 27 (Montana Workers’ Compensation Court 2010).
120. Id.
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An objective of the Montana workers’ compensation system is to provide,
without regard to fault, wage-loss and medical benefits to a worker suffering
from a work-related injury or disease. Wage-loss benefits are not intended to
make an injured worker whole but are intended to provide assistance to a
worker at a reasonable cost to the employer. Within that limitation, the
wage-loss benefit should bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost as
a result of a work-related injury or disease.121

This policy statement appears first in the declaration of public policy, and is
to be used “for the purposes of interpreting and applying” the entire Act.122
This opening declaration clearly indicates that the legislature wanted to emphasize the limits on benefits available in the workers’ compensation nofault system. In analyzing § 39–71–710, a statute that serves as a limit on
workers’ compensation benefits, the Caldwell Court should have more fully
addressed this policy statement, which discusses the limits on workers’
compensation benefits.123 Section 39–71–105(3), the statute describing the
policy for providing vocational benefits, is irrelevant to the analysis.
iii. Analyzing the Asserted Legitimate State Interest Served by
the Statute
1. Cost Alone Insufficient
The Court next considered MACo’s arguments that the statute was rationally related to a legitimate government interest.124 The majority began
by declaring that “cost containment alone” cannot justify disparate treatment under the Workers Compensation Act.125 It acknowledged that legislative attempts to control the cost of the workers’ compensation system
“lie[s] within constitutional authority,” but held that this cannot be the “sole
reason for disparate treatment” because “[i]f the Court permitted otherwise
‘cost containment’ alone could justify nearly every legislative enactment
without regard for the guarantee of equal protection of the law.”126
The Court’s reliance on this principle was absolutely critical to its
holding. Section 39–71–710 provides a limitation on benefits. Therefore,
it serves, indisputably, to contain the costs of the workers’ compensation
system. The principle that cost containment alone cannot justify disparate
121. Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–105(1) (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. The Court did cite § 39–71–105, addressing it without fully quoting it. The Court contended
that it was inapplicable because rehabilitation benefits “do not replace lost wages.” Caldwell, 256 P.3d
at 929. The Court’s contention that rehabilitation benefits do not replace lost wages argument is more
fully addressed below in the discussion of duplication of benefits.
124. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 928.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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treatment first appeared in Heisler v. Hines Motor Company.127 Though
routinely followed,128 this “sweeping conclusion” was vigorously disputed
by Justice Gray in her dissent in Heisler.129 Justice Gray argued that this
holding was “incorrect and ill-advised”:
The entire workers’ compensation system is premised on an economic compromise determined to be in the best interests of all concerned: employees
gave up the right to sue employers in tort for work-related injuries in exchange for a guaranteed compensation system; employers avoided the potential of unlimited tort liabilities in exchange for required “no fault” compensation payments to injured workers. . . . Thus, to an extraordinary extent, the
entire system is grounded in “cost control” of various kinds. The Court’s
conclusion that cost control can never justify disparate treatment eviscerates
the purpose and provisions of the Act.130

Justice Gray thus explained that the workers’ compensation system is based
on a fundamental compromise, a quid pro quo between employer and employee, and that cost-containment is elemental to this compromise.
In addition to Justice Gray’s contention, the approach creates a further
problem. It subtly displaces the burden of proof, shifting it to the State
when the constitutionality of legislative enactments should be presumed.131
This burden shifting is particularly evident in Caldwell in the following
statement: “We must scrutinize attempts to disguise violations of equal protection as legislative attempts to ‘contain the costs’ or ‘improve the viability’ of the worker’s [sic] compensation system. Cost alone does not justify
the disparate treatment of similar classes.”132
Considering the “grand bargain” represented by the workers’ compensation system and the application of the Act on presumably non-suspect
classes, cost control of workers’ compensation benefits should be regarded
as a stand-alone legitimate state interest. There would be two exceptions to
this rule. In testing for these exceptions the statute’s constitutionality
should be presumed. Cost control alone would be insufficient if (1) the
Court determines that the statute disparately burdens a suspect class, or (2)
the statute violates the quid pro quo, resulting in a substantive due process
violation. For example, if the legislature were to eliminate benefits only for
members of a certain race, then cost control alone would clearly be insufficient to justify the provision. Likewise, if the legislature were to simply
eliminate wage loss benefits while forcing workers to find their exclusive
127. Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 937 P.2d 45, 52 (Mont. 1997) (striking down as violative of equal
protection workers’ compensation statute that allowed certain workers’ compensation plans to limit a
workers’ choice of physician).
128. Henry, 982 P.2d at 461; Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 574;
129. Heisler, 937 P.2d at 54 (Gray, J., concurring and dissenting).
130. Id.
131. See e.g. Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc., 249 P.3d 913, 921 (Mont. 2011).
132. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 928 (emphasis added.)
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remedy through workers’ compensation, then the quid pro quo would not be
met, resulting in a violation of the worker’s substantive due process
rights.133
By contrast, if the legislature eliminates certain benefits to non-suspect
groups without violating the quid pro quo, the deferential rational basis test
should serve, and cost containment should represent a stand-alone legitimate state interest. This approach is correct because unless one of the two
above named exceptions exists, a workers’ compensation statute is indistinguishable from other economic provisions. In such a circumstance, legislative expertise to make difficult choices on policy mandates deference.
The limitation on benefits at issue in Caldwell was not directed at a
class traditionally regarded as suspect, nor would it appear that the limitation violates the quid pro quo. Thus, to the extent the statute results in
disparate treatment, the legislature—not the Court—is best situated to fix
the manner of payment of workers’ compensation benefits.
2. Assisting the Worker at a Reasonable Cost to the
Employer
After establishing that cost containment alone would be insufficient to
uphold the statute, the Court evaluated MACo’s other asserted interest.134
MACo asserted that the statute served the legitimate state interest in assisting the worker at a reasonable cost to employers.135 The Court rejected this
argument, holding that the statute did not relate to this interest and that it
133. See Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 915 P.2d 175, 180 (Mont. 1996) (“Stratemeyer II”); Walters, 249 P.3d at 918.
134. Combined, MACo and State Fund offered seven legitimate state interests that the statute served,
beyond cost-containment. MACo asserted: (1) creating a wage replacement system, (2) assisting the
worker at a reasonable cost to the employer, (3) controlling the costs of the workers compensation
program in order to continue providing benefits, (4) avoiding duplication or overlapping of benefits.
State Fund asserted: (5) providing wage-loss benefits that a bear a reasonable relationship to actual
wages lost, (6) creating reasonably constant rates for employers, and (7) tailoring benefit entitlement to
need. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929. This note will limit its review to the three most contentious issues: (1)
assisting the worker at a reasonable cost to the employer, (2) avoiding duplication of benefits, and (3)
tailoring benefit entitlement to need.
135. Id. at 928. The majority first stated that MACo had asserted that the challenged statute served
the legitimate state interest in “creating a wage replacement system.” The Court seems to have misconstrued MACo’s argument on this point. In its brief, MACo quoted § 39–71–105(1), and emphasized
that the wage replacement system created by the Workers’ Compensation Act was expressly limited to
assistance that could be supplied at a “reasonable cost to the employer.” Br. of Appellant at 8–9,
Caldwell, 256 P.3d 923. The Court, however, seems to have believed that MACo argued that the statute
served the purpose of “creating a wage replacement system.” It is not clear how this interest would
forward MACo’s position, because the challenged statute served as a limitation on benefits rather than a
creation of benefits. At any rate, the Court concluded: “The elimination of rehabilitation benefits cannot
be understood as serving, or even relating to, the governmental interest in creating a wage-replacement
system that bears a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost.” The Court’s holding largely ignored
MACo’s emphasis on the limitation on providing wage-replacement benefits.
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was duplicative of the cost-containment rational.136 In addressing this argument the Court stated: “We particularly reject the argument that ‘reasonable
cost to the employer’ always means ‘lower cost to the employer.’”137
The Court here expressed disdain for the State’s interest in enacting
legislation that reduces the cost of workers’ compensation by limiting
worker benefits. This is consistent with the Court’s abbreviated discussion
of § 39–71–105(1), the declaration of public policy which addresses the
limits on wage-loss benefits. The Court’s strident rejection of the State’s
interest in reducing the employer’s cost reveals a stark contrast between the
Court’s deferential review of a limitation on benefits in Satterlee and the
scrutinizing review evident in Caldwell.
3. Avoiding Duplication of Benefits
MACo also contended that the statute served the legitimate state interest of avoiding a duplication of benefits.138 MACo reasoned that once a
claimant begins receiving Social Security benefits it is rational for the legislature to reduce available benefits under the Workers’ Compensation
Act.139 Other jurisdictions have accepted this argument.140 Courts taking
this position often cite Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law,141 “a leading
treatise on workers’ compensation,”142 which provides:
Wage-loss legislation is designed to restore to the worker a portion . . . of
wages lost due to the three major causes of wage-loss: physical disability,
economic unemployment, and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of
wage loss; the cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable. Now if a worker undergoes a period of wage loss due to all
three conditions, it does not follow that he or she should receive three sets of
benefits simultaneously and thereby recover more than his or her actual wage.
The worker is experiencing only one wage loss and, in any logical system,
should receive only one wage-loss benefit.143

The treatise thus asserts that providing wage-loss benefits is the common
goal of both workers’ compensation laws and Social Security. Accord136. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See e.g. Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 599 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Kan. App. 1979); Harris
v. St. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 843 P.2d 1056, 1066 (Wash. 1993); McDowell v. Jackson Energy RECC,
84 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Ky. 2002).
141. Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law vol. 9 (Matthew
Bender, rev. ed., 2011).
142. Harris, 843 P.2d at 1066.
143. Larson, supra n. 141, at § 157.01.
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ingly, one Washington court held that “[t]he cause of wage loss—whether it
be old age, disability, or unemployment—is irrelevant.”144
Notwithstanding this position, the Court rejected MACo’s, and the dissent’s, contention that the statute related to the governmental interest in
avoiding duplication of benefits.145 The Court here relied heavily on
Reesor, wherein it had expressly rejected the duplication of benefits argument.146 The Court held that “no coordination of benefits exists between
the Workers’ Compensation Act and the social security system” and maintained that “social security retirement benefits are not wage loss benefits.”147
Two points about Reesor’s holding on this issue should be noted: (1)
Reesor did not address McClanathan v. Smith,148 in which the Court expressly recognized that offsets for payments received through the Social
Security system serve the legitimate government interest of avoiding duplication of benefits,149 and (2) Reesor was a 4–3 decision that appeared significantly circumscribed five years later by Satterlee.150
The Court insisted that “[r]ehabilitation benefits do not replace lost
wages,”151 but a review of the statutory framework contradicts this position.
The statute provides that rehabilitation benefits are only available to a “disabled worker” when his injury has resulted in “actual wage loss.”152 Furthermore, the “disabled worker” is eligible for rehabilitation benefits only if
“the worker will have a reasonable reduction in the worker’s actual wage
loss with rehabilitation.”153 While the Court may be correct that rehabilitation benefits do not directly replace lost wages, the statutes reveal that the
ultimate purpose of providing rehabilitation benefits is to replace lost
wages.
Given this, the precedent from McClanathan, and Larson’s position
that Social Security retirement is rooted in replacing lost wages, the Court’s
rejection of the duplication argument cannot be squared with the deference
mandated by the rational basis test.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Frazier v. Dept. of Lab. & Indus., 3 P.3d 221, 225 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2000).
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929–930.
Id.
Id.
McClanathan v. Smith, 606 P.2d 507 (Mont. 1980).
Id. at 514.
See Reesor, 103 P.3d at 1026 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing McClanathan, 606 P.2d at 513).
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39–71–1006(1)(a)(i), 39–71–1011(3).
Id. at § 39–71–1006(1)(b) (emphasis added).
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4. Tailoring Benefit Entitlement to Need
The Court also rejected State Fund’s “tailoring benefit entitlement to
need” argument.154 The Court criticized State Fund for its failure to cite
any applicable authority for this argument.155 But one need not search for
authority suggesting that government programs tailor benefits according to
need. One could argue that most government entitlement programs are premised on tailoring benefits according to need.156 For example, in Montana,
a person entitled to public assistance is termed a “needy person.”157 Similarly, by operation of the graduated tax rate, those who have lower annual
incomes are subject to a lower tax rate.158
Furthermore, Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc.—decided
by the Court only two months prior to Caldwell—provided relevant precedent for the “tailoring benefits to need” rationale.159 In Walters, Tim Walters, who had no dependents, was killed in a work-related accident. A
workers’ compensation statute directed wage-loss benefits to the dependents of deceased workers, but, for workers without dependents, it provided
only a $3,000 lump sum to the decedent’s parents. Though Walters’ mother
had lived with her son and received some assistance from him, she did not
meet the statutory definition of a dependent. Consequently, aside from hospital bills and funeral expenses, the only compensation paid to Walters for
her son’s death was the $3,000 lump sum. Walters challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that the meager payment violated the quid
pro quo and thus infringed on substantive due process.
The Walters Court rejected Walters’ challenge and held that the denial
of wage loss benefits was a rational allocation of limited funds to those
most in need—the dependent family members of deceased workers. The
Court held that “it was not irrational that the Legislature may have decided
to protect ‘the most vulnerable claimants . . . .’”160 The Walters Court
continued: “[the] favored treatment . . . reflects a legislative determination
that [those with dependents] require greater compensation, because of . . .
need.”161
154. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 930.
155. Id.
156. Indeed, Justice Baker echoes this idea in her dissent, where she stated, “the cut-off represents a
policy choice, entrusted to the legislature, to allocate resources toward those who, statistically speaking,
will use them. This is no more a mere cost-containment measure than our tax code is a mere revenuegenerating measure . . . .” Id. at 934 (Baker, J., dissenting).
157. Mont. Code Ann. § 53–2–101(2).
158. Id. at § 15–30–2103(1).
159. Walters, 249 P.3d 913.
160. Id. at 920 (quoting Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 575).
161. Id. at 921 (quoting Taylor, 694 P.2d at 1162).
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Thus, through Walters and a plethora of statutes the Caldwell Court
had readily available authority to support State Fund’s “tailoring” argument. Again, the Court rejected this asserted interest in derogation of the
rational basis standard’s stated deference to legislative determinations.
iv. Suggesting that Caldwell is a Member of a Suspect Class
Ultimately, the Court criticized MACo’s tailoring argument for what it
felt lurked “immediately beneath the surface.”162 The Court vehemently
rejected the notion that the legislature could direct resources to those who,
statistically, would most utilize the benefit. The Court characterized this
argument as “bias” against “older people.” The Court stated that this “approach would permit the legislature to provide benefits unequally to similarly situated persons so long as ‘empirical evidence’ or statistics supported
the legislature’s decision. . . . The statistical majority holds no monopoly
on equal protection guarantees.”163 Here, the Court exposed what is bubbling beneath the surface of its opinion—the unspoken belief that low-income, elderly workers operating within the workers’ compensation system
are in fact a quasi-suspect class entitled to increased protection. The Court
asserted:
Our equal protection analysis does not allow the legislature to violate the
equal protection rights of those persons who, statistically speaking, represent
the minority of persons who must continue working at ages beyond eligibility
for social security because they could not otherwise provide for themselves or
their families.164

One senses in these sentences that had Caldwell sought heightened scrutiny
the Court may well have overturned established precedent and agreed. The
Court clearly suggests that Caldwell is a member of a “minority,” thus providing the Court with justification for applying rational basis with bite. As
noted above, rational basis only applies when a law affects neither a suspect
class nor implicates a fundamental right.
The position that those operating within the workers’ compensation
system constitute a pseudo-suspect class due greater protection through a
more scrutinizing review of limitations on benefits has garnered some support from dissenting justices in the past. As previously noted, Justice Morris criticized the Court for applying a “toothless” standard in his dissent in
Satterlee. Also, Justice Trieweiler, dissenting in Stratemeyer, made the
case that the beneficiaries of workers’ compensation constitute a quasi-suspect class, so that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate level of scru162. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 930.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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tiny.165 Justice Trieweiler contended that “[i]n recent years in Montana, no
group has had less political influence and been the subject of more political
demagoguery than those unfortunate people injured and disabled during the
course of their employment.”166 A similar concern for the dwindling political influence of those in workers compensation system was expressed by
Justice Nelson, who dissented in Walters. There, Justice Nelson expressed
suspicion of “the direction of workers’ compensation reform” which, he
argued, increasingly threatened to undermine the quid pro quo on which the
system is based.167
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Court has repeatedly and uniformly rejected invitations to apply heightened scrutiny review of workers’
compensation statutes.168 Addressing specifically the same class of persons
as impacted in Caldwell, the Satterlee Court roundly rejected the plaintiff’s
invitation to apply heightened scrutiny:
Satterlee . . . urges us to apply a middle-tier analysis “given the rare combination of age discrimination and the total loss of workers’ compensation benefits found in the present statute.” . . . The statute at issue here does not infringe upon the rights of a suspect class or involve fundamental rights. While
we are sympathetic to any worker who suffers a loss of income, it would be
inappropriate for us to disregard the well established principle that rational
basis review applies to workers’ compensation claims. We do not agree with
Satterlee’s contention that the facts presented justify a heightened level of
scrutiny. Thus, rational basis is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
the instant case.

The Court was correct to reject the invitation to apply heightened scrutiny
in Satterlee. Classifications based on age have never been recognized as
creating a suspect class in Montana.169 Moreover, the argument that those
within the workers’ compensation system lack political influence ignores
the fact that a great percentage of the voting population is covered by workers’ compensation insurance.170

165. Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at 516–518 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 512.
167. Walters, 249 P.3d at 923 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
168. See Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 572 (collecting cases).
169. See e.g. Jaksha v. Butte-Silver Bow Co., 214 P.3d 1248, 1253–1254; Arneson v. State By and
Through Dept. of Admin., Teachers’ Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 1245, 1247–1248 (Mont. 1993).
170. It is estimated that 124.4 million people were covered by workers’ compensation in 2010, and
the total voting population in the U.S. numbered 229.7 million. See Ishita Sengupta, Virginia Reno, et.
al, Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs 2010 7, National Academy of Social Insurance (Washington D.C. 2012) http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/?les/research/NASI_Workers_Comp_
2010.pdf, and U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table 399, http://
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0399.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the area of workers’ compensation, the Montana Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly that “the power of the legislature to fix [the] amounts,
time and manner of payment of workers’ compensation benefits is not
doubted.”171 The Court in Caldwell seems to have lost sight of this principle.
What is worse, the Court’s efforts to closely scrutinize limits on workers’ compensation benefits may ultimately have unintended negative consequences for workers in the system. In this context, the Court’s efforts and
the legislature’s response via House Bill 334, call to mind Justice Black’s
dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly.172 In Goldberg, Justice Black criticized the
Court’s imposition of a constitutional due process requirement that a welfare beneficiary receive a full evidentiary hearing before welfare benefits
could be terminated:
The Court apparently feels that this decision will benefit the poor and needy.
In my judgment the eventual result will be just the opposite. . . . While this
Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will be taken off the
rolls without a full ‘due process’ proceeding, it will also have insured that
many will never get on the rolls . . . .173

As evidenced by the recent cuts to workers’ compensation benefits through
legislation that was motivated, at least in part, by a feeling that the judiciary
had created a workers’ compensation system where the State was forced to
“cover everybody for everything,” Black’s argument may apply with substantial force to the Court’s decision in Caldwell. Indeed, House Bill 334
attempts to insure that many will never get on the rolls by redefining “permanent partial disability,” so that it is much harder to obtain permanent
partial disability status and its associated benefits. The Montana Legislature has a mandate to curtail the rising costs of workers’ compensation premiums. The Court is an improper governmental tool to thwart this mandate.
The current divide in the Montana Supreme Court about the appropriate level of scrutiny, or deference, that should be applied under rational
basis review should be resolved in favor of deference according to the traditional standard. Limits on judicial power must be recognized. Furthermore, applying a “freewheeling” rational basis standard, as Justice Marshall
warns, is a flawed and “potentially dangerous” approach.174 To maintain
the integrity of stare decisis, and to hedge against arbitrary application of
171. See Walters, 249 P.3d at 920 (quoting Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 575) (alterations in original).
172. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
173. Id. at 278–279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
174. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 478 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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the levels of scrutiny, the Court must faithfully adhere to the tests it purports to apply.
Though the Court is rightly sensitive to limitations on workers’ compensation benefits, the Court’s current approach addresses this concern
inappropriately. The worker’s situation is uniquely concerning because the
worker has given up the right to ordinary legal redress and must find his
remedy exclusively within the workers’ compensation system. But instead
of applying rational basis with bite, a better approach would faithfully apply
rational basis, recognizing that “cost control” measures further stand-alone
legitimate state interests. For the reasons noted above, however, two preliminary determinations could be made before finding that “cost control”
provisions serve stand-alone legitimate state interests: (1) the Court must
determine if the statute operates on a suspect class, and (2) the court must
determine if the provision violates substantive due process by upsetting the
quid pro quo. Making these preliminary determinations assures that the
Court adequately addresses the unique circumstances of workers in the
workers’ compensation system. If the statute passes these two tests, however, the statute should be regarded as an ordinary economic regulation due
traditional deference.
In Caldwell, the Court deviated substantially from the traditional rational basis standard of review. While the Court should not ignore the
unique position of workers in the workers’ compensation system, the Court
should resist diluting its standards of review. In the area of economic regulation, the inherent limits on judicial power and respect for the separate
spheres of government power demands a faithful application of judicial restraint. Ultimately, judicial restraint in this area best serves both the worker
and the courts.
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